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[38 0.2d

Nov. 27, 1951.]

MAX SELINSKY, Respondent, v. A. W. OLSEN, .Appellant.
[1} Negligence- Instructions- Last Clear Chance.- Appellate
court must view evidence most favorable to contention that
last clear chance doctrine is applicable in reviewing order
granting motion for new trial on ground of refusal to give an
instruction on doctrine, since party invoking doctrine is entitled to an instruction thereon if the evidence so viewed could
establish the elements of the doctrine.
[2] Id.-Last Clear Chance-Elements of Doctrine.-Elements of
last clear chance rule are that plaintiff has been negligent
and, as a result thereof, is in a position of danger from which
he cannot escape by the exercise of ordinary care, and this
includes not only where it is physically impossible for him to
escape, but also where he is totally unaware of his danger
and for that reason unable to escape; that defendant has
knowledge that the plaintiff is in such a situation, and knows,
or in the exercise of ordinary care should know, that plaintiff
cannot escape from such situation; and that defendant having
the last clear chance to avoid the accident by exercising ordinary care, fails to exercise the same, the accident results
thereby, and plaintiff is injured as the proximate result of
such failure.
[3a, 3b] Automobiles-Last Clear Chance.-Last clear chance doctrine was not inapplicable because plaintiff, whose car was
struck while pulling away from curb, was aware of his dangerous position where his motor stalled when his car was
protruding into lane of traffic and jury could infer that he
was incapable of extricating himself by exercise of ordinary
care.
[4} Negligence-Last Clear Chance.--Rule that there can be no
recovery where negligence of injured party was contemporaneous, concurrent, continuing and contributory up to moment of impact does not mean that last clear chance doctrine
is unavailable when plaintiff is negligent up to tim(" of collision, for his negligence is one of factors that brings it to play.
[5] Automobiles-Last Clear Chance.-Under evidence most favorable to plaintiff, defendant could have seen plaintiff's automobile standing in road ahead of him for minute before im-

[1] See 19 Cal.Jur. 745, 760; 38 Am.Jur. 1055.
[2] See 19 Cal.Jur. 651; 38 Am.Jur. 903.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Negligence, § 217; [2] Negligence,
§48; [3,5] Automobiles, §152; [4] Negligence, §49; [6] Automobiles, § 305.
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pact and thus could, by exercise of ordinary care, have avoided
accident, where it appeared that defendant was looking
straight ahead as he approached plaintiff's car, which had
stalled while pulling away from curb, and that defendant's
view was unobstructed.
[6] !d.--Province of Court and Jury-Last Clear Chance.-Wherc
evidence is conflicting, it is for jury to determine whether or
not defendant had, by exercising ordinary care, the last clear
chance to a vert a collision of vehicles .
.APPEAr~ from an order of the Superior Court of Los
.Angeles County granting a new trial. Otto J. Emme, Judge.
Affirm ecl

Action for damages for personal injuries.
plaintiff a new trial, affirmed.

Order granting

Crider, Hunk1e & Tilson and E. Spurgeon Rothrock for
Appellant.
Edward Mosk for Respondent.
CARTER, .J.-A motion for a new trial after judgment for
defendant on the ground of refusal to give an instruction on
the last clear chance doctrine was granted to plaintiff and
defendant appeals.
[1] vVe must view the evidence most favorable to the
contention that the doctrine is applicable in reviewing the
order appealed from, since plaintiff is entitled to an instruction thereon if the evidence so viewed could establish the
elements of the doctrine. (Bonebrake v. McCormick, 35 Cal.2d
16 [215 P.2d 728] ; Alberding v. Pritchard, 97 Cal.App.2d 443
[217 P.2d 1012]; 19 Cal.Jur. 745.)
Plaintiff's car w.as parked heading north, parallel to the
curb in the parking· lane on the east side of Crenshaw Boulevard, a north-south street with four traffic lanes and two
parking lanes. It was about a half block north of 8th Street,
which crosses Crenshaw. One car was parked 5 or 6 feet in
front and another at least 25 feet behind his. Plaintiff testified that he entered his car, looked through the rearview
mirrors, one inside and the other outside the car, and the
only cars he observed were westbound standing on 8th Street
at the intersection waiting for the traffic signal to change.
He pulled away from the curb and when the left front end
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of his car was protruding 2 feet into the outside traffic
lane his motor stalled and his ear stopped. About five seconds
later, according to plaintiff, and a minute according to another witness, and while plaintiff's car was still stopped,
defendant, proceeding north on the outside traffic lane on
Crenshaw, collided with the left front of plaintiff's car.
Defendant testified that he did not see plaintiff's car until
he was 15 feet behind the front of it, but admitted, and the
evidence shows, that his view was unobstructed between the
8th Street intersection and plaintiff's car; that be was looking
straight ahead and could have seen a car protruding as plaintiff's did for a distance of 50 feet to the south of it; and that
he was traveling 20 to 25 miles per hour. He testified first
that he tried to swerve to the left and later that he did not
remember, and that he applied his brakes when he saw plaintiff's car.
[2] 'fhe elements of the last clear chance rule are "[1]
That plaintiff has been nrgligent and, as a result thereof,
is in a position of danger from which he cannot escape by the
exercise of ordinary care; and this includes not only where
it is physically impossible for him to escape, but also in cases
where he is totally unaware of his danger and for that reason
unable to escape; [2] that defendant has knowledge that the
plaintiff is in such a situation, and knows, or in the exercise
of ordinary care should know, that plaintiff cannot escape
from such situation, and [3] has the last clear chance to avoid
the accident by exercising ordinary care, and fails to exercise
the same, and the accident results thereby, and plaintiff is
injured as the proximate result of such failure.'' (Girdner v.
U11Jion Oil Co., 216 Cal. 197, 202 [13 P.2d 915] .)
[3a] Defendant contends that the doctrine is not here
applicable because plaintiff was aware of his dangerous position and could have saved himself by the exercise of ordinary
care; that is, the first element is lacking." [4] Further in
that connection, the rule is asserted to be that there can be
no recovery where the negligence of the injured party was
contemporaneous, concurrent, continuing and contributory up
to the moment of the impact. ·while the foregoing statement
may be correct wht>n properly applied, considerable confusion
has arisen from it because it has been applied where the last
clear chance doetrine has been unsuccessfully relied upon.
In effect, it merely means that one of the elements of the
doctrine is lacking; or that plaintiff's contributory negligence
is a bar to his recovery. (Girdner v. Union Oil Co., supra,
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216 Cal. 197.) It does not mean that the doctrine is unavailable
when plaintiff is negligent up to the time of the collision,
for his negligence is one of the factors that brings it into
play. (Girdner v. Union Oil Co., supra, 216 Cal. 197.)
[3b] It may be true that plaintiff was negligent in pulling
away from the curb and was aware of his dangerous position,
but when his car was protruding into the lane of traffic, his
motor stalled, and the jury could infer that he was incapable
of extricating himself by the exercise of ordinary care. Plaintiff's car was stopped from five seconds to a minute before
the collision. There is a conflict on that point but it should
have been left to the jury under the last chance doctrine
instruction. We hold, therefore, that the first element finds
support in the evidence.
[5] The second factor is lacking, urges defendant, because
there is no showing that defendant was aware of plaintiff's
perilous position or knew he could not escape therefrom. That
depends upon the view one takes of the evidence. It is true
that defendant testified that he did not see plaintiff's car
until he was directly behind it, when plaintiff drove his car
into the line of traffic in front of him, and that plaintiff's
car was in motion at the time of the impact. Other evidence
shows, however, that defendant was looking straight ahead
as he approached plaintiff's car and his view was unobstructed.
It may be inferred therefrom that he saw plaintiff's motionless
car extending into the line of traffic. (Hoy v. Tornich, 199
Cal. 545 [250 P. 565]; Bailey v. Wilson, 16 Cal. .App.2d 645
[61 P.2d 68]; Hellman v. Bmdley, 13 Cal..App.2d 159 [56
P.2d 607] ; Handley v. Lombardi, 122 Cal.App. 22 [9 P.2d
867]; Ba;ird v. James A. Hill Canst. Co., 138 Cal.App. 410
(32 P.2d 390]; Galwey v. Pacific Auto Stages, Inc., 96 Cal.
App. 169 [273 P. 866] .) Thus we do not have a case in which
plaintiff's car was in motion or suddenly appeared in defendant's path as existed in the authorities relied upon by defendant. The jury could have inferred also, that defendant knew
or should have known, in the exercise of ordinary care, that
plaintiff could not escape. Under the evidence most favorable
to plaintiff, defendant could have seen plaintiff's car standing
in the road ahead of him for a minute before the impact and
thus could, by the exercise of ordinary care, have avoided the
accident.
[6] The third element was not established, says defendant,
because he could not have avoided the collision, having neither
time nor means to do so. It was for the jury to determine
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whether in the space of time involved he could have avoided
the collision. From a photograph of Crenshaw Boulevard,
put in evidence, and which is pertinent to the issue (H1tetter
v. Andrews, 91 Cal.App.2d 142, 146 [204 P.2d 655]), it appears that the distance between the cars parked along the
curb and the first white line between the two traffic lines,
defendant could have swerved to the left without crossing
that line to avoid colliding with plaintiff's car. Moreover,
it will be remembered that Crenshaw Boulevard had two lanes
for northbound traffic. Defendant could have swerved left
over to the lane next to the center line. True, defendant
testified that there was a car traveling in that lane slightly
to his rear, but the jury could have disbelieved that testimony.
It was vague. Defendant said he did not see the car; that he
was ''conscious'' of it-'' possibly heard'' it. He also said
there was not enough room to avoid plaintiff's car without
crossing the white line, but when shown the photograph,
stated that it "looked wider." Thus, we believe it was a
matter for the jury to determine. vVe cannot say as a matter
of law that he did not, by exercising ordinary care, have the
last clear chance to avert the collision-something more than
a split second possible chance.
A case clearly similar is Gi·rdner v. Union oa Co ..• supra,
216 Cal. 197, in which the doctrine was held applicable. There
plaintiff had his car moving in an intersection and was oblivious of defendant's approach thereto in a truck. The latter
first saw plaintiff's car when 40 to 50 feet from it and was
traveling about 20 miles per hour. Here it may be inferred
that defendant saw plaintiff's car standing and obstructing
the traffic line for a distar.ce of about 50 feet, and at that
time defendant was traveling 20 to 25 miles per hour. (See,
also, Bonebrake v. JJ1c0ormick, supr-a, 35 Cal.2d 16; Giorgetti
v. Wollaston, 83 Cal.App. 358 [257 P. 109] ; Podeszwa v. White,
99 Cal.App.2d 777 [222 P.2d 683]; Yates v. JJ!orotti, 120
Cal.App. 710 [8 P.2d 519] .)
The negligence of defendant could have consisted of his
failure to keep a proper lookout ahead to observe vehicles
in his path, which negligence was the proximate cause of the
accident.
The order is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Edmonds, J., concurred.
Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred in the
judgment.

